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The Presidential report on the intelligence failure during the buildup to the war in Iraq is out. It appears to be very critical of the entire intelligence community. While I haven’t yet read the entire report I have looked at the summary. I am hopeful that the conclusions of this report and the publicity it gets will mobilize the administration and the public to demand a robust intelligence capability.
The commission concluded the intelligence while not distorting the facts was “dead wrong”. Dead wrong folks. That’s unacceptable. It’s impossible to conduct a positive foreign policy if your information of threats is not correct. But why was it so wrong. The report says.
“In the end, those agencies collected precious little intelligence for the analysts to analyze, and much of what they did collect was either worthless or misleading.”
“The Intelligence Community is a closed world, and many insiders admitted to us that is has an almost perfect record of resisting external recommendations.”
“The Community’s Iraq assessment was crippled by its inability to collect meaningful intelligence on Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs…..analysts and collectors fell back on old assumptions and inferences drawn from Iraq’s past behavior and intentions.”
During the case studies it was learned that our Intelligence agencies didn’t have good target development. Using traditional techniques the Intelligence community was unable to penetrate the threats of today. The analysis procedures were found flawed and the report found that many finished products were “loosely reasoned, Ill-supported, and poorly communicated”.
The report hit on something I’ve wondered about for years after watching Army intelligence at work, the analyst rely too much on classified material for their product and tend to overlook much of the open source information that is out there. This is where you find the information on the culture and political trends of the threat areas.
In my area of work we have very little faith in the entire Intelligence field. While deployed I read so many Intelligence summaries that were nearly useless to us at a team level and some didn’t appear accurate in their conclusions. Now this was not at the Strategic level but the lower tactical level. Still the same issues seem to be in both places.
Some of the reports recommendations are:
Strong leadership to manage the Intelligence Community
Organize around missions
Establish a National Counter Proliferation Center
Build a modern workforce
Create mechanism for oversight from inside or out
Create a new Intelligence Community process for managing collection as an integrated enterprise.
Create a new human Intelligence directorate
Develop innovative human intelligence techniques
Reconsider MASINT ( Measurements and signatures Intelligence)
And much more……
I’ll let those that take the time to read this document to determine if the recommendations are valid. I find them somewhat bureaucratic.
We must have faith in our intelligence community and we must give then the ability to do the job. This can only be achieved if the Intelligence community is willing to change to fit the needs of the modern Intelligence environment. Intelligence must be product/target based. Conclusion must come after the fact and not before. We must also be willing to rid the Intelligence community of “Elite” thinkers and get “boots on the ground” Intelligence people in the field and behind the desk.
Anyway that’s my initial thoughts all subject to change at anytime for any reason….
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